Using long-term sovereign ratings data for a panel of 130 countries over the last three decades, we rely on discrete-time Weibull models to investigate the duration and determinants of sovereign ratings phases. We find that the likelihood of the end of the 'speculative-grade' phase increases as time goes by (i.e. positive duration dependence), but the 'investmentgrade' phase is not duration dependent. Thus, for sovereigns rated as speculative, the build-up of reputation as good borrowers is a gradual process, whereas the reputation of investmentgrade sovereigns solidifies and remains unchanged as time passes. However, the length of both phases has proven to be significantly dependent on the country's economic conditions and the quality of governance. In particular, lower inflation, better economic performance and sounder fiscal policies shorten (prolong) the speculative-(investment-) grade phase. In addition, a better perception of the quality of public services and the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations help to reduce the duration of speculative-grade phases.
Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a crucial role in the development of financial markets. By publishing information on the ability of entities (such as, banks, firms and sovereigns) to meet their financial obligations, CRAs contribute to the correction of market failures caused by asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.
Updates of credit risk ratings also influence market participants' behaviour with implications for international capital flows and borrowing costs. Hence, in response to new information provided by CRAs, capital can move away from 'risky' investments and towards 'high-grade' investments (i.e. the so-called 'flight to quality') and low-credit ratings entities pay higher interest rates than those with better credit standards.
On the one hand, the reporting activity of CRAs stimulate borrowers to pursue sounder financial and economic policies aimed at enhancing their capability to access international capital markets (Agnello et al., forthcoming) . On the other hand, it could inadvertently destabilize financial markets and generate spillover effects. 1 These concerns emerged dramatically during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, when the financial stress faced by countries like Greece, Ireland and Portugal spilled to other EU countries leading to a significant rise in sovereign bond yield spreads. In this context, CRAs were often blamed for being somewhat pro-cyclical in their ratings assessments, thus, potentially exacerbating contagion (Michaelides et al., 2015) . 2 These episodes have revived the interest among academics and practitioners on the behaviour of sovereign credit ratings and their impact on global financial markets. In 1 Duggar et al. (2009) analyse crises in Indonesia (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , Russia (1998 Russia ( -1999 and Argentina (2001 Argentina ( -2002 , and find that 61% of default episodes by rated corporations occurred during sovereign crises. 2 In practice, once financial problems of Greece, Portugal and Ireland emerged, CRAs also downgraded the creditworthiness of other major Eurozone economies (e.g. France, Austria) putting in motion a process driving yield spreads to higher levels and creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of potential default (Aizenman et al., 2013) . particular, the opacity of the methodology underlying the determination of sovereign ratings 3 led many authors to empirically assess their main drivers. 4 Yet, the existing works leave some relevant questions about an important dimension of sovereign ratings open: Does the likelihood of exiting a specific phase increase or decrease as time goes by? What are the determinants of the duration of sovereign ratings phases? How do economic developments and the quality of institutions influence the length of sovereign ratings phases?
To address these questions, we follow a three-step strategy. First, we consider the history of long-term sovereign ratings for a sample of 130 developed and emerging economies over the last three decades. Thus, we rely on the identification of 'speculative-grade' and 'investment-grade' using Fitch's convention to construct phases (or spells of time) over which sovereign issuers have been given a specific rating (risk) class. Second, we consider a set of macroeconomic and qualitative indicators, which are expected to affect the duration of sovereign ratings phases. Third, we estimate discretetime Weibull duration models to test for the presence of duration dependence and identify those variables influencing the length of each sovereign ratings phase.
Our main empirical findings can be summarised as follows. We show that sovereign credit ratings phases are characterised by significant differences in their duration dependence. In particular, the likelihood of a speculative-grade phase' ending increases as time goes by (i.e. there is positive duration dependence), while the investment-grade phase is not duration dependent. This is consistent with the idea that "time" matters for the build-up of reputation and the view that sovereign ratings exhibit greater stability at higher ratings levels than at lower ratings. 3 Credit Rating agencies underline that they do not use a specific formula to combine the various political and economic factors in deciding on a specific rating. 4 See, for instance, Cantor and Packer (1996) , Juttner and McCarthy (1998) , Ferri et al. (1999) , Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) , Sy (2002) , Mora (2006) , Hu et al. (2002) , Afonso et al. (2011) and Broto and Molina (2016) .
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Concerning the role played by economic and institutional factors in determining the length of sovereign rating phases, we find that lower inflation, better economic performance and sounder fiscal positions shorten (protract) the speculative-(investment-) grade phases.
Interestingly, we also show that the quality of governance plays a key role. In particular, for sovereigns experiencing a speculative-grade phase, a positive perception of the quality of public services and the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations can help to accelerate their ratings upgrade, especially in the case of sovereign debt denominated in foreign currency. For instance, in the case of (domestic-) foreign currency-denominated debt, a one point rise in the composite index of governance quality increases the probability of a speculative-grade ratings phase ending by, approximately, 25% (39%). By contrast, institutional factors are, from a statistical point of view, much less important for the duration of sovereigns' investment-grade spells, which reflects the fact that these countries are typically developed and already benefit from a strong institutional framework.
Finally, we find that being part of OECD group of countries is associated with a lower probability that an investment-grade phase ends. The length of the speculativegrade phase is also shorter for advanced economies than for emerging markets.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of the related literature. Section 3 details the econometric strategy. In Section 4, we describe the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, while Section 6 provides the sensitivity analysis. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude and draw the main policy implications. 5
Literature Review
There is a large body of the literature looking at the main drivers of sovereign ratings. Using cross-sectional data for 49 countries as of September 1995, Cantor and Packer (1996) find that sovereign ratings are generally consistent with economic fundaments. In particular, the estimates of a simple linear regression model indicate that their dynamics can largely be explained by variables, such as per capita income, GDP growth, inflation and external debt. The authors also show that sovereign ratings impact on sovereign bond spreads. More specifically, US Treasury bond spreads rise by 0.9 percentage points after negative rating announcements, and fall by 1.3 percentage points in the case of positive announcements. Sy (2002) also finds a negative correlation for emerging market bond spreads over the US Treasury bill rate. Juttner and McCarthy (1998) extend the analysis by Cantor and Packer (1996) , and examine the determinants of Moody's and S&P's sovereign ratings for a range of mature and emerging market economies in the mid-1990s. They conclude that the linear relationship between the variables identified by Cantor and Packer (1996) and sovereign ratings was stable until 1997. After the outbreak of the Asian crisis, additional controls (such as the ratio of problematic bank assets over GDP and the interest rate differentials) seem to play a major role in explaining sovereign ratings.
Using Moody's data for 17 countries, Ferri et al. (1999) find that, during the Asian crisis, credit ratings of East Asian countries behaved in a pro-cyclical way as a result of ratings downgrades more than macroeconomic fundamentals would justify. This, in turn, impacted market expectations and aggravated the crisis.
Other works draw similar conclusions on the pro-cyclical nature of sovereign ratings. For example, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) use a panel of 16 emerging markets including East Asian, Eastern European, and Latin American economies, and 6 find that CRAs upgrade countries in good times and downgrade them in bad times.
They also find that changes in sovereign ratings contribute to contagion and spillover effects, with rating changes among emerging markets triggering fluctuations in both yield spreads and stock returns in foreign countries. Mora (2006) revisits the results by Ferri et al. (1999) and reaches different conclusions. By extending the sample to the post-Asian crisis period from 1999 to 2001, the author finds that sovereign credit ratings are sticky rather than pro-cyclical and remained over-conservative after the crisis. In addition, the author finds that sovereign ratings react passively to market sentiment (as proxied by spreads) and are driven by political factors. Hu et al. (2002) rely on ordered probit models to assess the determinants of sovereign ratings and estimate the rating transition matrices. The empirical findings suggest that default history, lower reserves, higher inflation, higher debt to GNP ratio, being a non-industrial country and higher ratio of debt service to exports lower the quality of credit. A similar methodological approach is used by Afonso et al. (2011) .
Considering sovereign ratings for a large panel of countries over the period 1995-2005, they find that per capita GDP, real GDP growth, external debt and external reserves, and government debt and effectiveness are the most important sovereign debt rating drivers.
A recent paper by Broto and Molina (2016) departs from the traditional empirical literature in that it focuses on the characteristics and determinants of sovereign rating 'cycles', instead of ratings per se. The authors assume that a credit cycle consists of two phases: 1) a 'downgrade' phase, where the rating goes from peak to trough; and an 'upgrade' phase, where the rating improves. Estimating logit and ordered models for a sample of 67 emerging and developed countries over the period 1994:Q1-2013:Q1, they show that rating cycles are characterised by strong asymmetry. More specifically, downgrade phases are shorter than upgrade phases, as rating agencies are 7 faster at updating ratings in response to the economic recovery (during downgrade phases) and more prudent at revising ratings even in case of strong economic performance (during upgrade phases). Consequently, downgrade phases behave in a pro-cyclical way, whereas upgrade periods tend to be relatively sticky.
Our paper contributes to this strand of research on the determinants of sovereign ratings phases. In this respect, it is inspired by the work of Broto and Molina (2016) .
Yet, from a conceptual point of view and an empirical perspective, it departs from existing studies in two main aspects. First, we pay close attention to the duration of sovereign ratings phases rather than the occurrence of a particular rating change. From a policy perspective, this distinction is important because welfare implications can be quite different. For instance, the welfare losses due to a rating downgrade are relatively small if a (subsequent) upgrade takes place shortly afterwards. By contrast, welfare losses can be particularly high if the average duration of a (lower) rating class is long.
Second, we test for the presence of duration dependence, that is, we assess how time (i.e. own age) affects the length of sovereigns ratings phases. From an operational point of view, this provides valuable information to market participants both about the timing of sovereign ratings revisions and, most importantly, the transition across different credit risk classes. To give some economic intuition, we highlight that the passage of time gives sovereigns the opportunity to build up and/or solidify their reputation as good or bad borrowers. If a certain sovereign seizes (misses) such opportunity, then, the probability of a rating upgrade increases (declines) over time.
And, obviously, for sovereigns with an already fairly solidified reputation as excellent borrowers (e.g., AAA-rated sovereign bonds), we might even expect that the probability of exiting the investment-grade phase does not significantly change as time passes by. 8
Econometric Methodology
We rely on the class of hazard-based duration models. These econometric frameworks have been used to analyse the duration of business cycle phases and unemployment spells (Kiefer, 1988; Sichel, 1991; Castro, 2010) . In financial economics, they were employed to investigate the existence of duration dependence in stock markets cycles (Lunde and Timmermann, 2004) , the determinants of housing booms and busts (Agnello et al., 2015a; Bracke, 2013) and the length of periods of financial markets' shutdown and re-access (Agnello et al., 2018) . Agnello et al. (2013) also make use of duration analysis to assess the drivers of the duration of fiscal consolidation programs. Agnello et al. (2015b) Because of their properties, duration models are particularly well-suited to test whether the likelihood of a sovereign rating phase ending depends (or not) on its own age. In addition, their applicability to discrete-time model specifications accommodates external covariates and, therefore, allows one to assess the main determinants of the duration of each phase.
To better understand the theoretical reasons behind the use of hazard models, we start by introducing two key concepts, namely: the hazard function and the survival functions. Let T be a non-negative continuous random variable measuring the time span between the beginning of a sovereigns rating phase and the moment it ends with probability distribution F(t) = Pr(T<t), i.e. the probability of T being smaller than a certain value t. Then, we can define the survivor function at time t, S(t) = Pr(T≥t) = 1-9 F(t) as the probability that the duration of sovereign rating phase is at least equal to t.
From this and the density function, f(t), we get the the hazard function at time t as
. This function measures the conditional probability of a sovereign rating phase ending at time t given that it lasted until to that point in time.
Depending on the sign of the derivative of h(t) with respect to t, we may have:
dependence means that the likelihood of a sovereign rating phase ending increases (decreases) as the time goes by.
The shape of the hazard function has important implications for the duration dynamics. The proportional hazard model is one of most popular parametric forms for the hazard function, as it can accommodate the effect of time-varying covariates:
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard, β is a (k×1) vector of parameters that need to be estimated and x is a vector of time-invariant covariates. We impose a specific parametric form for the function h0(t) using a Weibull model:
where γ is a constant while p is a non-negative parameter providing information about the nature of duration dependence. A value of p greater (lower) than 1 indicates the existence of positive (negative) duration dependence. If p equal to one, there is no evidence of duration dependence. Replacing (2) into (1), we have:
(3)
So far, we have assumed that the duration variable T is continuous and the hazard function h(t) varies on a continuous-time scale. Thus, h(t) can be interpreted as 10 the instantaneous probability that a sovereigns rating phase ends in an infinitesimally small time period T after time t, given that the duration has not elapsed until time t.
Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, data collected in our study are discrete and organised on yearly frequency basis. It follows that continuous-time duration models are not the most adequate to use (Allison, 1982) .
However, their discretisation, as proposed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) , Allison (1982) , and Jenkins (1995), is viewed as a valid solution to the problem and is commonly used in the empirical literature. In addition, discrete-time duration models have the important advantage of allowing for the inclusion of time-varying covariates.
Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) , a discrete-time version of the proportional hazards model can be written as:
represents the logarithm of an unspecified (baseline hazard) function of time and xit is a vector of time-varying control variables. A popular specification for t is the discrete-time analogue to the continuous-time Weibull model, which yields: 5 Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Allison (1982) show that discrete-time loglikelihood function for a sample of n i ,..., 1  spells can be written as follows:
where the dummy variable yit is equal to 1 if the end of a sovereign rating phase for a country i ends at time t, and 0 otherwise. The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood substituting Pij by (4) and t by (5).
Data
We use a sample of 130 industrialized and emerging countries for which longterm sovereign ratings are reported by Fitch Ratings Inc. since the eighties. Depending on the likelihood of repayment of their obligations, each rated sovereign is assigned a specific rating category over a scale mapping from AAA (i.e. the highest credit quality)
to D (i.e. default). Either plus (+) or minus (-) signs are added to further refine the rating, thus, leading to a rating system that consists of twenty-four grades of risk.
Given the scope of the paper, we group sovereigns into two broad categories.
Specifically, according with Fitch Ratings Inc.'s conventions (Fitch, 2017) , sovereign borrowers are assigned to: (i) the Investment-grade category, if their obligations are rated BBB-or higher, thereby, indicating relatively low to moderate credit risk; and (ii)
the Speculative-grade category, if they issue bonds with a credit rating BB+ or below, thus, signalling either a higher level of risk or that a default has occurred (or it is likely to occur). We construct both categories of risk using both local currency-and foreign currency-denominated debt ratings with the objective of checking whether the gap between the two ratings affects the results of our analysis. 6, 7 12 Then, we organize annual observations in spells, where a spell denoted by
Dur_rank represents the number of consecutive years that a sovereign is assigned the Speculative-grade or the Investment-grade category.
As the second objective of the paper is to identify the main variables affecting the length of sovereign ratings phases, we consider a set of macroeconomic and institutional determinants. Based on the empirical literature exploring the factors behind sovereign ratings (Broto and Molina, 2016; Cantor and Packer, 1996; Hu et al., 2002; Afonso et al., 2011) , we use a selection of relatively standard variables that are expected to influence credit ratings and that can be grouped as follows:
 Macroeconomic indicators, which track the country's economic performance, namely: (i) the inflation rate; and (ii) the real GDP growth.
 Fiscal variables, which account for the ability of the country to service its debt, including: (iii) the budget balance to GDP ratio; (iv) the public debt to GDP ratio; and (v) the trade balance (as percentage of GDP . Each indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values denoting a higher quality in a specific field of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2010) .
We remark that, even though the original dataset consists of annual data for 130 countries until 2017, the presence of missing values for fiscal variables and the limited WGI coverage (which is confined to the period of 1996-2016) reduce the number of usable observations. This -together with the awareness that duration models are computationally demanding -, explains why we opt for a parsimonious model specification that privileges the use of a "core" set explanatory variables.
A summary of the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the empirical analysis can be found in Table 1 . For local currency-denominated debt, we identify 13 spells of speculative-grade rating phases, which vary in length from one year to 21 years, thereby, generating 566 observations for our discrete-time duration analysis.
Concerning foreign currency-denominated debt, we distinguish 28 spells of speculativegrade rating phases, which vary in length from one year to 22 years, thus, generating 690 observations. The mean duration of speculative-grade rating phases is about 7 years for both domestic and foreign currency-denominated debt.
Regarding investment-grade rating phases, we identify 19 spells (or 1273 observations) for local currency-denominated debt, and 20 spells (or 1260 observations) for foreign currency-denominated debt. Investment-grade rating phases have an average duration of around 10.5 years, with the length ranging between one and 48 years.
[ In Figure 1 , we plot the survival function for speculative-grade rating phases (top panel) and investment-grade rating phases (bottom panel). Left-hand side diagrams refer to local currency-denominated debt, while right-hand side diagrams correspond to foreign currency-denominated debt. It can be seen that the probability of speculativegrade rating phase surviving after a certain duration substantially decreases over time, especially in the case of foreign currency ratings. Thus, in the next Section, we empirically assess if this decline is consistent with the presence of duration dependence.
By contrast, the survivor function for investment-grade rating phases displays less variation over time, which suggests absence of duration dependence.
[ FIGURE 1 HERE. ]
Empirical Findings
In this section, we report results of the cloglog models as defined by equations (4)-(5). In practice, we estimate the model  
Dur_rank measures the duration of a sovereigns rating phase and its coefficient q allows us to test for the presence of duration dependence. As demonstrated in Section 3, = − 1 ⇔ = + 1, where p is the duration dependence parameter. In section 5.1, we present results for the speculative-grade phase, while the empirical findings for the investment-grade phase are reported in section 5.2. Table 2 summarises the main results from the estimation of discrete-time Cloglog duration models applied to the speculative-grade phase. It focuses on local currency-denominated debt. In column (1), we present estimates from a very basic model which only includes time-effects (not reported for sake of space) and the OECD dummy variable. Then, we assess the role played by a vector of time-varying control variables as described in Section 4. Specifically, we first control for the importance of macroeconomic indicators (columns 2-3); then, we include fiscal variables in the model (columns 4-5); and, finally, we enlarge the model specification to account for governance quality indicators (columns 6-12). To keep the model parsimonious, we add one indicator of the quality of governance at time to the set of explanatory variables.
The phase of speculative-grade
Looking at the results in Table 2 , we note that, regardless of the model specification, the coefficient associated with the variable Dur_rank (q) is always positive and statistically significant. This implies that the estimate of the duration dependence parameter (p = q + 1) is statistically greater than 1 (positive duration dependence) and, therefore, the likelihood of a speculative-grade phase ending increases as it becomes "older". This evidence can be interpreted as supporting the view that, for speculative-rated sovereigns, building up the reputation as a good borrower can be thought as a gradual (sometimes, long-lasting) process.
Regarding the role played by quantitative control variables, we find that favourable economic performance significantly reduces the length of time spent by a sovereign in a speculative-grade phase. Specifically, a fall in inflation, a rise in GDP growth and an improvement of the trade balance are key for sovereigns to exit such phase. For instance, a one percentage point rise in GDP growth increases the likelihood of speculative-grade ratings phase ending by between 12.5% and 18.9%. These results corroborate the view that sound macroeconomic conditions increase a country's ability to service its local-currency commitments and favour an upgrade of its credit risk rating.
Moreover, our findings indicate that the quality of governance matters: a one point rise in the composite index of governance quality boosts the hazard rate of a 16 speculative-grade ratings phase ending by close to 25%. In particular, a positive perception of the quality of public services (as measured by the government effectiveness) and greater capability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations (as proxied by regulatory quality) are the most important qualitative aspects that speed up the end of a speculative-grade phase.
Finally, we note that the coefficient associated with the OECD dummy variable is statistically significant in most of the cases, which suggests that the length of speculative rating phases for debt denominated in domestic currency is shorter for OECD countries than for non-OECD countries.
[ Table 3 describes the evidence for duration of speculative-rating phases in the case of foreign currency-denominated debt. The results are in line with those shown in Table 2 . Despite this, the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated parameters point to sovereigns being rated differently depending on whether their ratings are based on the ability to meet domestic or foreign currency-denominated financial obligations (Packer, 2003) .
In general, the empirical findings confirm the presence of positive duration dependence, but this evidence is less significant than in Table 2 . Thus, speculative rating phases based on foreign currency-denominated debt tend to be less sensitive to the passage of time than those based on domestic currency-denominated debt. This result lends support to the idea that the presumed ability and willingness of sovereigns to meet financial obligations denominated in their own currency is greater than in the case of debt denominated in foreign currency (Packer, 2003) . Consequently, as time goes by, the likelihood of the end of a speculative-grade phase is more (less) significantly affected for debt denominated in domestic (foreign) currency.
Looking at other explanatory variables, we note that higher public debt, more inflation and trade balance deterioration undermine the ability of sovereigns to meet their obligations denominated in foreign currency. Therefore, such macroeconomic developments lead to longer speculative-grade phases. For example, a one percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a fall in the odds of a speculative-grade ratings phase of between 2% and 5%. Interestingly, GDP growth is not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with speculative ratings reflecting the existence of structural problems that prevent domestic authorities to speed up the transition to an investment grade by means of good economic performance.
We also find that institutional quality impacts positively the probability that a speculative-grade phase ends, with the effect being even more important for foreign currency-denominated debt than that found for debt denominated in domestic currency (see Table 2 ). Indeed, in the case of foreign currency-denominated debt, a one point rise in the composite index of governance quality increases the probability of a speculativegrade ratings phase ending by, approximately, 39%. Government effectiveness and regulatory quality improvements are especially relevant for shortening the length of the speculative-grade phase, thus, promoting the transition to an investment-grade phase.
Finally, the OECD dummy variable is significant in the majority of model specifications, which indicates that, for foreign currency-denominated debt, the duration of speculative-grade phases is shorter in advanced economies than in emerging markets.
[ TABLE 3 HERE. ]
The phase of investment-grade
The empirical findings for the duration of the investment-grade phase are presented in Tables 4-5. Table 4 presents the evidence for ratings on debt denominated in local currency, while Table 5 provides a summary of the findings for ratings on foreign currency-denominated debt. Table 4 shows that, for local currency-denominated debt, the evidence in favour of duration dependence in the investment-grade phase is, from a statistical view point, weak. Indeed, despite the fact that the sign of the coefficient associated with the variable Dur_rank is always negative (which can be interpreted as a signal of negative duration dependence, as p = q + 1 < 1), this variable is either insignificant or only significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that, once a sovereign's reputation as an excellent borrower has solidified, it generally remains unchanged as time goes by. Putting this finding in conjunction with that for the speculative-grade phase, we can conclude that higher sovereign ratings exhibit greater stability than lower sovereign ratings.
In what concerns the significance of control variables, we find that, improvements in economic growth and sounder fiscal positions (as reflected by lower public debt-to-GDP ratio and higher fiscal budget balance-to-GDP ratio) reduce the probability of investment-grade phase ending. For example, a one percentage point rise in the fiscal surplus (expressed in percentage of GDP) reduces the hazard rate of an investment-grade phase ending by between 22.1% and 27.1%.
Contrary to the speculative-grade phase, the importance of governance quality is rather limited. That is, compared to the duration of speculative-grade spells, the length of the investment-grade phase appears to be less sensitive to the quality of governance.
In fact, only improvements in the control of corruption and political stability appear to significantly contribute to longer investment-grade spells. This is in line with the view 19 that investment-grade rated sovereigns are, generally, developed economies with strong macroeconomic performance and stable fiscal policies. The sign and statistical significance of the OECD dummy variable aligns with this interpretation: being part of OECD group is associated with longer investment-grade phases.
[ Table 5 summarises the results for the duration of investment-grade ratings on foreign currency-denominated debt. They are broadly similar to those obtained for local currency debt ratings. However, two major differences emerge. First, trade balance (as percentage of GDP) is now statistically significant. Its coefficient is negative, which shows that an improvement in net exports prolongs the duration of investment-grade phases. This is consistent with the evidence that persistent trade deficits are normally associated with growth in foreign indebtedness levels, which can ultimately undermine the creditworthiness of "net exporting" countries. Second, among the set of fiscal variables, we note that the government budget balance (as percentage of GDP) outweighs the statistical significance of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Thus, the consolidation of the public finances increases the so-called "fiscal space", thus, providing the necessary resources to meet their financial obligations.
[ TABLE 5 HERE. ]
Sensitivity Analysis
In Section 5.1., we did not find a clear support for the presence of duration dependence in investment-grade rating phases. Nevertheless, the coefficient associated 20 with the variable Dur_rank was always negative (regardless of the model specification used in the analysis) and, in six out of twelve specifications, it was also significant (albeit only at the 10% level). Thus, this evidence can (weakly) signal a (latent) negative duration dependence. In particular, for top-rated sovereigns, rating agencies may be less prone to downgrade their ratings as time goes by.
To empirically explore this possibility, we perform an assessment of the determinants of the duration of investment-grade spells for sovereigns with an exceptionally strong capacity to meet their financial commitments. More specifically, we focus on sovereigns whose domestic currency-and foreign currency-denominated debt is rated by Fitch as AA-or higher over the entire sample period.
We include all these sovereigns in a category labelled as "high-grade", and investigate whether the likelihood of exiting this rating class changes as time passes by, that is, we evaluate the presence of duration dependence therein. We expect that the longer the permanence in this "top" rating category, the lower the probability of a downgrade and the longer the duration of the "high-grade" rating phase.
We identify 16 spells of high-grade rating phases for local currencydenominated debt, which generate 667 observations (see Table 1 ). These spells have an average duration of 11 years. We also identify 12 spells of high-grade rating phases for foreign currency-denominated debt, thus, generating 610 observations. These spells' average duration is 11.6 years. Finally, high-grade rating phases have a duration ranging between one and 48 years for both domestic and foreign currency-denominated debt.
The empirical results associated with the duration analysis on high-grade rating phases are presented in Table 6 . In columns (1)-(6), we report the estimates of the duration model based on domestic currency ratings, while columns (7)-(12) summarise the findings for foreign currency ratings. 21 We find that the variable Dur_rank is significant and the sign of its coefficient is always negative, that is, p = q+1 <1, which corroborates the presence of negative duration dependence. Thus, the likelihood of a "high-grade" phase ending declines with the passage of time, in line with the consolidation of the borrower's strong reputation.
As expected, this evidence is stronger when sovereigns' creditworthiness is evaluated using domestic currency ratings. And, interestingly, the length of the "highgrade" rating phase is less sensitive to economic developments than the duration of the investment-grade rating phase.
Yet, fiscal conditions continue to play a very important role, with fiscal surpluses significantly prolonging the duration of "high-grade" spells. This effect is especially pronounced in the case of debt denominated in foreign currency: a one percentage point rise in the government budget balance-to-GDP ratio is associated with a fall in the likelihood of a "high-grade" rating phase of between 15.8% and 20.2% in the case of domestic currency-denominated debt, and of between 29.5% and 32.7% in the case of foreign currency-denominated debt.
[ 
Conclusions
We use data on sovereign ratings for a sample of 130 developed and emerging countries to understand the dynamics of investment-grade and speculative-grade phases.
Compared to the existing literature, the two major novel aspects of the paper are: (i) to explore the presence of duration dependence in such phases; and (ii) to investigate the determinants of their length using discrete-time Weibull duration models. 22 The empirical findings indicate that the speculative-grade rating phase displays positive duration dependence, while the investment-grade rating phase is not duration dependent. This is consistent with greater stability of sovereign ratings at top of the distribution of the bond credit tier than at the bottom of the distribution.
Conditioning the duration of both phases on a set of control variables, we find that lower inflation, stronger growth and sounder fiscal positions shorten (prolong) the speculative-(investment-) grade phase. Moreover, improvements in the quality of governance (especially, concerning government effectiveness and regulatory quality) reduce the length of speculative-grade rating phases. Finally, we show that, for local currency-denominated debt, investment-grade phases are longer in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries; and, for foreign currency-denominated debt, speculativegrade phases are shorter in OECD countries compared to non-OECD countries From a policy perspective, our empirical findings have important implications.
First, the evidence on duration dependence confirms that time plays an key role not only for understanding the duration of sovereign rating phases, but also for assessing the transition across different sovereign rating classes. Thus, building up a good reputation as a borrower is naturally a gradual process for speculative-rated sovereign bonds in the sense that it requires time until the upgrade to the investment-class takes place. By contrast, investment-rated sovereign bonds appear to be more immune to changes in their rating tiers even as time goes by. Interestingly, sovereign issuers rated AA-or higher -i.e. borrowers with a very strong or extremely strong capacity to meet their financial commitments -typically display longer investment-grade spells.
Second, domestic and foreign currency-denominated debt ratings behave in a way that promotes domestic bond market development (Packer, 2003) . This helps governments to shield against volatile foreign currency-denominated investment flows.
Third, the analysis on the determinants of the duration of sovereign ratings phases reveals that growth-friendly economic policies coupled with fiscal discipline and strong quality of governance can shorten (prolong) the speculative-(investment-) grade rating phases. Therefore, such policies are welfare-improving. -5 .832*** -6.057*** -6.060*** -6.987*** -6.059*** -6.222*** -5.313*** -6.999*** -6.442*** -6.223*** -6.463*** (1. N_s  13  13  13  13  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  LogL -58.73 -56.38 -53.64 -45.26 -41.24 -39.58 -40.17 -38.32 -41.24 -37.15 -39.50 -39.58 
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